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9 **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT**
10 **DISTRICT OF NEVADA**

11 In re

12 AMERICAN WEST DEVELOPMENT,
13 INC., a Nevada corporation,

- 14 fdba Castlebay 1, Inc.
- 15 fdba Development Management, Inc.
- 16 fdba Fairmont 1, Inc.
- 17 fdba Glen Eagles 3, Inc.
- 18 fdba Heritage 1, Inc.
- 19 fdba Inverness 5, Inc.
- 20 fdba Kensington 1, Inc.
- 21 fdba Kingsbridge 1, Inc.
- 22 fdba Promontory Estates, LLC
- 23 fdba Promontory Point 4, Inc.
- 24 fdba Silverado Springs 1, Inc.
- 25 fdba Silverado Springs 2, Inc.
- 26 fdba Tradition, Inc.
- 27 fdba Windsor 1, Inc.,

Debtor.

Case No. BK-S-12-12349-MKN

Chapter 11

**DEBTOR'S REPLY TO THE ACTING
UNITED STATES TRUSTEE'S
OBJECTION TO DEBTOR'S FIRST
AMENDED CHAPTER 11 PLAN OF
REORGANIZATION**

[Relates to Docket Nos. 714 and 812]

Hearing Date: January 15, 2013

Hearing Time: 10:00 a.m.

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

The Objection is a textbook example of failing to see the forest for the trees. The Plan before the Court received overwhelming creditor support. The Plan before the Court was proposed by Debtor as a good faith effort to reorganize its financial affairs, preserve value and provide fair and equitable treatment to creditors of this estate. The Plan before the Court will establish the Construction Defect Trust as a well-funded mechanism to resolve Construction Defect Claims. The Plan before the Court remedies each of the grounds upon which the Court denied confirmation of the original Plan.

The Objection fails to acknowledge any of these key points. Instead, the UST criticizes non-existent provisions, makes conclusory allegations and inapposite comparisons, and takes statements completely out of context. Central among these is the UST’s erroneous allegation that the Plan includes nonconsensual third-party releases and injunctions. It does not. Also central to the Objection is the unsubstantiated assertion that the Futures Representative has somehow failed to perform his duties with “sufficient vigor.” Yet the UST fails to identify any specific actions the Futures Representative purportedly failed to take, much less explain how these actions would have had any impact on whether the Plan should be confirmed.

Contrary to the UST’s theoretical contentions, the facts that are of record in this Chapter 11 Case amply demonstrate that Debtor has satisfied its burden to prove the Plan should be confirmed. The Plan complies with the Bankruptcy Code and applicable Ninth Circuit law. Parties in interest have had a full and fair opportunity to be heard, and no party with an economic stake in Debtor’s estate has raised any objection to the Plan. The Futures Representative has prudently and diligently represented the interests of his constituents. Despite Debtor having voluntarily waived its right to exclusivity on May 29, 2012, no one has come forward with any colorable alternative to the Plan that would treat creditors of Debtor’s estate as well or better than they will be treated under the Plan. Therefore, the Court should overrule the Objection and enter an order confirming the Plan.

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1 **II. ARGUMENT**

2 **A. The Plan Does Not Include Non-Consensual Third-Party Releases or**
 3 **Injunctions.**

4 In response to the prior objection filed by the UST, the Court declined to confirm Debtor’s
 5 original plan [Docket No. 263] (the “May Plan”) based, in part, upon the fact that the May Plan
 6 included non-consensual releases of third parties and permanent injunctions against pursuing claims
 7 against third parties. See Order Denying Confirmation of Debtor’s Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization
 8 [Docket No. 723] (the “Confirmation Denial Order”). In its current Objection, the UST once again
 9 contends that the Plan should not be confirmed because it contains impermissible third-party releases
 10 and injunctions. However, the Objection misses the mark because, unlike the May Plan, the Plan now
 11 before the Court does not include any non-consensual third-party releases or injunctions.

12 Instead, Debtor took great pains to remove all provisions for non-consensual third-party releases
 13 and injunctions from the Plan. These changes are clearly reflected in the redline version of the Plan that
 14 was filed at the Court’s request on October 30, 2012 [Docket No. 727] (the “Plan Redline”). As
 15 indicated in the Plan Redline:

- 16 • The reference to “Related Persons” was deleted from both (i) the exculpation provisions
 17 of section 12.3 of the Plan, and (ii) the definition of “Exculpated Party” used therein.
- 18 • Section 12.4(b) was clarified to clearly limit its effect to consensual releases granted by
 19 parties who voted in favor of the Plan, including all Holders of Construction Defect
 20 Claims for whom the Futures Representative casts a Ballot (but excluding any release of
 21 the Futures Representative for purposes of any Ballot that the Futures Representative
 22 casts).
- 23 • Section 12.5(a) was clarified to clearly limit its injunctive effect to parties who
 24 consensually granted releases by voting in favor of the Plan.
- 25 • The exculpation injunction in section 12.5(b) was deleted.
- 26 • The “channeling injunction” in section 12.5(d) was expressly limited to protect only
 27 Debtor, Reorganized Debtor, the Estate, the Assets, the Distribution Agent and the
 28 Professionals—the reference to third-party “Affiliates” was deleted.

1 Thus, the changes reflected in Article XII of the Plan are directly responsive to the very specific
2 grounds upon which the Court denied confirmation of the May Plan. See Confirmation Denial Order at
3 ¶2(b) and (d) (sustaining prior UST objection on the grounds that “under current Ninth Circuit law, the
4 injunctive provisions set forth in Section 12.5(d) of the Plan, solely as they apply to and protect non-
5 debtors third parties, are prohibited” and that “the injunctive provisions set forth in Section 12.5(b) of
6 the Plan, solely as they apply to and protect the Futures Representative, are prohibited under current
7 Ninth Circuit law”).

8 The current Plan does contain provisions for consensual releases and injunctions that benefit
9 third parties. However, these consensual provisions do not implicate the effect of section 524(e) under
10 Ninth Circuit law. See Resorts International, Inc. v. Lowenschuss (In re Lowenschuss), 67 F. 3d 1394
11 (9th Cir. 1995). Instead, the consensual releases and injunctive provisions set forth in sections
12 12.4(b)&(c) and 12.5(a) of the Plan are appropriately and consensually given in exchange for the
13 consideration provided to Holders of Allowed Claims who vote in favor of the Plan. See In re Pacific
14 Gas & Elec. Co., 304 B.R. 395, 416-18 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2004) (confirming plan providing for
15 governmental agency’s release of debtor’s parent entity and its officers and directors because agency
16 consented to release); In re Hotel Mt. Lassen, Inc., 207 B.R. 935, 941 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1997).

17 Indeed, this Court has observed that “[n]either Lowenschuss or American Hardwoods addressed
18 consensual third-party releases and therefore do not appear to prohibit consensual third-party releases
19 from being included in a Chapter 11 plan.” In re Russell Boulder, LLC, Case No.BK-S-10-29724-
20 MKN (Bankr. D. Nev. March 2, 2012) (Memorandum Decision on Confirmation of Debtor’s Amended
21 Plan of Reorganization at p. 14, n.17) (citing Hotel Mt. Lassen, Inc.). Therefore, Article XII of the Plan
22 is entirely consistent with current Ninth Circuit law.

23 The UST also raises a tardy and unsubstantiated challenge to the ability of the Futures
24 Representative to consent to the releases and injunctive relief set forth in sections 12.4(b) and 12.5(a) of
25 the Plan on behalf of Class 4 Construction Defect Claimants who chose not to vote to accept or reject
26 the Plan. This is an impermissible collateral attack on the order approving the disclosure statements and
27 solicitation procedures, which expressly confers this ability on the Futures Representative. See
28 Amended Order: (I) Approving (A) Adequacy of First Amended Master Disclosure Statement [...]

1 [Docket No. 791] (the “Amended Disclosure Statement Order”) (“Holders of Class 4 Claims who have
 2 not filed a proof of claim and who do not vote to accept or reject the Plan shall be deemed to have
 3 delegated to the Futures Representative their rights to vote and their rights to grant the consensual non-
 4 debtor releases set forth in section 12.4(b) of the Plan”).

5 The Amended Disclosure Statement Order was entered following a hearing that was on full
 6 notice to the UST and all creditors. See Affidavit of Service dated October 31, 2012 [Docket No. 730];
 7 Notice of Entry re: Amended Disclosure Statement Order [Docket No. 794]. Contrary to the UST’s
 8 allegations, this issue was clearly and specifically addressed in Debtor’s motion seeking entry of the
 9 Amended Disclosure Statement Order. See [Docket No. 718] at pp. 15-17. The UST had a full and fair
 10 opportunity to object to this relief, and failed to do so. Moreover, the Objection appears to challenge
 11 not only the voting provision in the Amended Disclosure Statement Order, but also the provisions of the
 12 order appointing the Futures Representative, which was entered on **April 12, 2012**. See [Docket No.
 13 189] (the “Appointment Order”). Any attempt to seek relief from the Amended Disclosure Statement
 14 Order or the Appointment Order could only proceed by way of motion pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule
 15 9024 (incorporating Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60) and is not properly before the Court in the
 16 context of the Objection.²

17 Finally, even if the Court were to consider the substance of the UST’s arguments concerning the
 18 Futures Representative’s ability to consent on behalf of non-voting Construction Defect Claimants, the
 19 arguments have no merit. The fact that the future claims representative in Johns-Manville was not
 20 granted the power to bind claimants does not create a prohibition for any future claims representative to
 21 do so. The Bankruptcy Code permits a designated representative (like the Futures Representative) to
 22 vote on another party’s behalf under appropriate circumstances such as these. See, e.g., In re Avondale

24 ² Debtor is cognizant that, as the Court noted in connection with its ruling on the May Plan, even
 25 if a disclosure statement is approved under section 1125(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, the adequacy of
 26 disclosure may be revisited at plan confirmation. See, e.g., In re Michaelson, 141 B.R. 715, 720
 27 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1992). However, the UST has not challenged the adequacy of Debtor’s disclosure
 28 regarding the ability of the Futures Representative to grant consensual releases on behalf of
 Construction Defect Claimants (nor in any other respect). As described in greater detail below, this
 disclosure was comprehensive. Therefore, there is no basis in fact or law to revisit the issue now.

1 Gateway Center Entitlement, LLC, 2011 WL 1376997 (D. Ariz. 2011) (citing authorities). Indeed,
2 Bankruptcy Rule 3018(c) expressly recognizes that acceptance or rejection of a chapter 11 plan may be
3 submitted by an authorized agent of an eligible creditor. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3018(c). Thus, courts have
4 accepted votes cast on behalf of creditors by other designated representatives, such as a court-appointed
5 examiner, see In re Swyter, 263 B.R. 742, 744 (E.D. Va. 2001), or a subrogee under an intercreditor
6 agreement, see Avondale at id.

7 The UST has not cited any authority to the contrary. The G-I Holdings, Inc. case concerned
8 completely different facts—there, the debtor was attempting to involuntarily conscript the future claims
9 representative as a defendant in a declaratory judgment action in order to bind claimants. See G-I
10 Holdings, Inc. v. Bennet (In re G-I Holdings, Inc.), 328 B.R. 691, 693 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2005). The court
11 specifically relied upon the fact that the debtor was attempting to use the future claims representative
12 for a “nonbankruptcy” purpose in a “nonbankruptcy proceeding” as the basis for its decision that the
13 representative could not bind claimants for purposes of the declaratory judgment action. See id. at 696-
14 97. Accordingly, the court held that the declaratory judgment action did not sufficiently safeguard the
15 claimants’ rights to due process. See id. at 697.

16 Here, the Construction Defect Claimants have been given ample due process. They received
17 notice of the disclosure statement hearing, which gave them a full and fair opportunity to be heard
18 regarding the proposed relief set forth in the Amended Disclosure Statement Order that would authorize
19 the Futures Representative to consent on behalf of non-voting Construction Defect Claimants. More
20 importantly, each Construction Defect Claimant received a ballot that explains in clear, highlighted
21 language that by choosing not to submit a vote on the Plan they would be delegating their right to vote
22 to the Futures Representative, who intended to vote in favor of the Plan on their behalf and bind them to
23 the Plan’s consensual releases and injunctions. See Amended Disclosure Statement Order at Exhibit D;
24 Affidavit of Service dated December 20, 2012 [Docket No. 808].

25 In order to withhold consent from the Futures Representative to vote on their behalf and bind
26 them to the releases and injunctions provided in the Plan, all the Construction Defect Claimants needed
27 to do was complete and return a ballot voting to reject the Plan. By affording this clear option to
28 Construction Defect Claimants, the Plan amply satisfies the due process concerns that were found to be

1 lacking in G-I Holdings. In addition, the action by the Futures Representative at issue here—voting to
 2 accept or reject a chapter 11 plan—is at the heart of the bankruptcy process, unlike the nonbankruptcy
 3 declaratory judgment action before the court in G-I Holdings. The Bankruptcy Code and the
 4 Bankruptcy Rules expressly permit this action to be taken by a designated representative like the
 5 Futures Representative.

6 Therefore, the UST could not satisfy the standards of Rule 60 even if it had acted timely
 7 according to the proper procedure, and the Objection should be overruled on this ground.

8 **B. The Plan Has Been Proposed In Good Faith.**

9 The UST challenges whether Debtor has met its burden to prove that the Plan was proposed in
 10 good faith based on an inapposite comparison with the provisions of section 524(g) of the Bankruptcy
 11 Code. As discussed above, the Plan no longer contains the kind of nonconsensual releases and
 12 injunctions that may be implicated by section 524. Therefore, even if the provisions of section 524(g)
 13 were relevant to the May Plan, the removal of all nonconsensual release and injunctive provisions from
 14 the current Plan has eliminated any basis for this comparison.

15 Good faith for purposes of section 1129(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code must be evaluated based
 16 upon “the totality of the circumstances. . . on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the particular
 17 features of each . . . plan.” Hornwood v. Sylmar Plaza, L.P. (In re Sylmar Plaza), 314 F.3d 1070, 1074
 18 (9th Cir. 2002). The Ninth Circuit has rejected attempts to impose a *per se* rule to govern the good
 19 faith analysis. See id. As the court in Dow Corning aptly observed:

20 [The plan before the court] was proposed in a legitimate effort to
 21 rehabilitate a solvent but financially-distressed corporation, besieged by
 22 massive pending and potential future product liability litigation against
 23 it—an articulated policy objective of chapter 11. A plan proposed as a
 24 means to resolve tort liability claims does not violate the § 1129(a)(3)
 25 “good faith” confirmation requirement. [citation omitted] . . . The
 Debtor ‘is a real company with real debt, real creditors and a compelling
 need to reorganize in order to meet these obligations’ and is therefore,
 exactly the type of debtor for which chapter 11 was enacted.

26 In re Dow Corning Corp., 244 B.R. 673, 676-77 (Bankr. E.D.Mich.1999) (emphasis added). Cf. In re
 27 The Billing Resource, 2007 WL 3254835, 12 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2007) (citing Dow Corning).

1 When the Court properly considers the Plan under the facts and circumstances at hand, Debtor's
2 good faith in proposing the Plan is readily apparent. The Plan represents the culmination of Debtor's
3 restructuring efforts, and of this Chapter 11 Case. At all times, Debtor's goal has been to reorganize its
4 financial affairs, to preserve value and provide fair and equitable treatment to creditors of the estate.
5 The Plan accomplishes this goal by restructuring the Term Loan owed to the Secured Lenders,
6 providing \$1,500,000 in cash to satisfy Class 3 General Unsecured Claims (which is estimated to result
7 in a recovery that may approach 80% due to Debtor's successful restructuring of the Term Loan and the
8 waiver of the Secured Lenders' deficiency claim), providing the opportunity to all home owners to
9 receive the Cash Out Payment, and establishing the Construction Defect Trust to administer Class 4
10 Construction Defect Claims for those home owners who do not make the Cash Out Election.

11 The UST has not adduced any evidence that would contravene this prima facie showing of good
12 faith. Instead, the UST criticizes the Futures Representative (not Debtor), in conclusory fashion, for
13 allegedly failing to perform his duties "with sufficient vigor." As a threshold matter, the Futures
14 Representative is not a proponent of the Plan, so the vigor with which he performed his duties is
15 irrelevant to Debtor's good faith in proposing the Plan. It is true that Debtor cited its request to appoint
16 the Futures Representative as being indicative of Debtor's good faith. But once the Futures
17 Representative was appointed, his performance stands and falls on its own merits.

18 Moreover, the UST does not provide any reasons to justify its contention that the Futures
19 Representative did not perform adequately, and Debtor is not aware of any such reasons. Indeed,
20 Debtor experienced the diligence of the Futures Representative firsthand—Debtor provided the Futures
21 Representative with access to Debtors' construction documents upon request, Debtor negotiated a
22 stipulation with the Futures Representative regarding voting on the Plan, and Debtor discussed with the
23 Futures Representative the reasons why the treatment of Construction Defect Claims under the Plan was
24 the best available under the circumstances.

25 During these discussions, the Futures Representative questioned why the Plan provides for the
26 amount of funding to the Construction Defect Trust to depend on the voting results for the Plan (rather
27 than providing for the full \$1,500,000 amount in all circumstances). Debtor explained that (i) the DIP
28 Lender insisted that it receive sufficient consideration (in the form of widespread consensual releases

1 from Construction Defect Claimants) in return for funding the full \$1,500,000 amount, but (ii) Debtor
2 successfully convinced the DIP Lender to increase the minimum funding for the Construction Defect
3 Trust from \$200,000 (as originally proposed by the DIP Lender) to the \$500,000 amount provided for in
4 the Plan.

5 The Futures Representative cannot change the difficult realities of Debtor's financial
6 condition—he can only review the relevant information and analyze whether the Plan provides fair and
7 equitable treatment for his future claimant constituency under the circumstances. The fact that the
8 Futures Representative ultimately concluded to support the Plan does not impugn Debtor's good faith in
9 proposing the Plan—it reinforces it. To hold otherwise would be to adopt a *per se* rule in direct
10 contravention of Ninth Circuit law.

11 Therefore, the record in this Chapter 11 Case, including the overwhelming creditor support for
12 the Plan, provides ample grounds upon which the Court can conclude that the Plan was proposed in
13 good faith.

14 **C. The Plan is Feasible.**

15 The UST challenges whether Debtor has met its burden to satisfy the “feasibility” requirements
16 of section 1129(a)(11) of the Bankruptcy Code based upon a misreading of the Liquidation Analysis
17 filed in connection with the Plan.

18 In the Liquidation Analysis (attached as Exhibit B to the Master Disclosure Statement), Debtor
19 used an estimate of \$80 million for its maximum liability on Construction Defect Claims. As a matter
20 of full disclosure, Debtor noted its belief that, under the Plan, the actual aggregate amount of Allowed
21 Class 4 Construction Defect Claims will be significantly lower and is not likely to exceed
22 approximately \$8 million. However, Debtor referenced the full \$80 million amount in its Liquidation
23 Analysis based on the fact that “in a Chapter 7 liquidation there can be no assurance that there will be
24 sufficient funding and expertise to achieve commensurate results in the adjudication of these claims.”

25 The UST misconstrues this explanation (contained in a footnote) to suggest that “the success of
26 the construction defect trust contemplated by the Plan” is premised solely on the amount of cash that
27 would be used to fund the Construction Defect Trust. This interpretation is taken wholly out of context,
28 and completely misses the point. The purpose of the Liquidation Analysis is to compare the treatment

1 that creditors will receive under the Plan to the treatment they would receive in a hypothetical chapter 7
2 liquidation. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7). For purposes of this comparison, Debtor contrasted (i) the
3 Construction Defect Trust, which will receive cash funding of \$1,500,000³ and which will be
4 administered by a Construction Defect Trustee and a Construction Defect Trust Advisory Board with
5 specific expertise in the residential homebuilding industry, and (ii) a chapter 7 liquidation, where no
6 cash funding would be provided specifically to administer Construction Defect Claims, and which
7 would be administered by a chapter 7 trustee who might not have any experience in the residential
8 homebuilding industry. Thus, the Plan provides a clear advantage over a chapter 7 liquidation by
9 ensuring that there will be specific funds dedicated to the adjudication of Construction Defect Claims,
10 which will be administered by well-qualified fiduciaries.

11 The UST's suggestion that recoveries for the Construction Defect Trust are too speculative and
12 uncertain to be feasible echoes its prior contention that the self-insured retention amounts under
13 Debtor's insurance policies render the potential benefits of the Construction Defect Trust illusory. It is
14 true that Insurance Recoveries and the potential proceeds of Insurance Coverage Actions and
15 Construction Defect Actions cannot be quantified at this time. But this is true for any chapter 11 plan
16 that is proposed before all of the potential assets and causes of action vested in the estate have been
17 liquidated. If debtors were required to resolve every possible contingency that might impact the
18 implementation of a plan in order to prove its feasibility, then chapter 11 plans would never be
19 confirmed because by the time a debtor could do so the estate would have been fully administered.

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21
22 ³ The Plan provides for the Construction Defect Trust to be funded with either \$1,500,000 or
23 \$500,000, depending on whether a sufficient percentage of Construction Defect Claimants vote to
24 accept the Plan and grant the consensual releases. See Errata to Debtor's First Amended Chapter 11
25 Plan of Reorganization [Docket No. 784]. As long as the votes of the Futures Representative on behalf
26 of non-responding Construction Defect Claimants are counted, the requisite percentage has been
27 satisfied (triggering the higher \$1,500,000 funding amount). See Declaration of Jeffrey S. Stein of the
28 Garden City Group, Inc. Reporting and Certifying the Methodology for the Tabulation of Votes on and
Results of Voting With Respect to Debtor's First Amended Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization filed
concurrently herewith. Ironically then, the only obstacle to prevent the Construction Defect Trust from
being funded with the full \$1,500,000 is the UST's tardy and meritless challenge to the ability of the
Futures Representative to grant the consensual release. See §A, supra.

1 Instead, the key issue for determining feasibility as it applies to the Construction Defect Trust is
2 whether it has “has a reasonable probability of success.” In re Acequia, Inc., 787 F.2d 1352, 1364 (9th
3 Cir. 1986). Accord In re Sound Radio, Inc., 103 B.R. 521, 524 (D.N.J. 1989), aff’d, 908 F.2d 964 (3d
4 Cir. 1990); Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 843 F.2d 636, 649 (2d Cir.
5 1988) (“[T]he feasibility standard is whether the plan offers a reasonable assurance of success. Success
6 need not be guaranteed.”); In re Orlando Investors, L.P., 103 B.R. 593, 600 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989)
7 (“The purpose behind the statutory requirement of feasibility is to prevent confirmation of visionary
8 schemes which promise creditors and equity security holders more under a proposed plan than the
9 debtor can possibly attain after confirmation.”) (internal quotations omitted).

10 The Plan amply provides the Construction Defect Trust with a reasonable probability of success
11 by: (a) vesting it with valuable (though as yet unliquidated) assets in the form of Insurance Recoveries,
12 Construction Defect Actions⁴ and Insurance Coverage Actions; (b) appointing well-qualified fiduciaries
13 to administer these assets and determine the interests of all beneficiaries; (c) establishing clear and
14 appropriate procedures to govern the administration process; and (d) funding the Trust with \$1,500,000
15 in initial liquidity. All of these well-founded attributes of the Construction Defect Trust ensure that the
16 Plan provides Construction Defect Claimants with the best available opportunity to have their claims
17 treated in a fair and equitable manner. There is no better alternative on the table, and the UST does not
18 even speculate that there could be.

19 Moreover, as the Futures Representative has recognized, Debtor has a very low historic
20 incidence of construction defects in the homes that it constructs, which is reinforced by the very small
21 number of Construction Defect Claims that have been asserted in this Chapter 11 Case, See Evans
22 Declaration at ¶ 24. This too is a key factor that must be taken into account when evaluating the *bona*
23 *fides* of the Construction Defect Trust. If the total number and amount of Allowed Construction Defect
24 Claims ultimately proves to be small, then the cash funding for the Construction Defect Trust alone may
25 be sufficient to satisfy all of these claims in full. In contrast, if the total number and amount of Allowed

26 ⁴ One specific example of a Construction Defect Action is Debtor’s claims against its former
27 plumbing contractor, Interstate Plumbing, which are the subject of the proof of claim in the amount of
28 not less than \$5 million filed by Debtor in the Interstate Plumbing chapter 7 bankruptcy case.

1 Construction Defect Claims ultimately proves to be large, the impact of any self-insured retention
2 requirements on Insurance Recoveries will be significantly reduced.

3 Therefore, under the facts and circumstances of this Chapter 11 Case, the Construction Defect
4 Trust has a sufficiently reasonable probability of success to satisfy the feasibility requirements of
5 section 1129(a)(11).

6 **D. The Objection Should Be Overruled on All Other Grounds As Well.**

7 In addition to the arguments discussed above, the UST also raises at least two other issues in
8 perfunctory fashion: (i) the continued service of the Futures Representative; and (ii) whether parties had
9 sufficient time to file objections to the Plan. Neither of these issues provides any basis for the Court to
10 deny confirmation of the Plan.

11 First, the Plan provides for the Futures Representative to be discharged from his duties as of the
12 Effective Date. As such, the provisions of section 1129(a)(5) regarding post-confirmation service are
13 inapplicable to the Futures Representative. It is true that Mr. Moore, who currently serves as the
14 Futures Representative, also is the proposed Construction Defect Trustee. However, the UST has not
15 provided any basis to challenge Mr. Moore's qualifications to serve as Construction Defect Trustee.
16 Indeed, Mr. Moore's qualifications are a matter of record in this Chapter 11 Case. See Declaration of
17 Disinterestedness of James. L. Moore re: Motion for Order Appointing Future Claims Representative
18 [Docket No. 185]. Moreover, Mr. Moore will be supported by the Construction Defect Trust Advisory
19 Board, whose qualifications are set forth in Exhibit "I" attached to the Master Disclosure Statement.
20 Therefore, Debtor has satisfied the requirements of section 1129(a)(5) in all respects.

21 Second, the UST premises its criticism of the timing for objections to the Plan on the allegation
22 that the Plan contains "extraordinary relief . . . in the form of channeling injunctions and non-debtor
23 third party releases." This premise (as set forth above) is entirely incorrect. See §A, supra. The Plan
24 no longer contains any nonconsensual third-party releases or injunctive provisions. Furthermore, no
25 one other than the UST objected to the nonconsensual third-party releases and injunctive provisions that
26 were contained in the May Plan, which was filed on full notice to all parties. The Plan before the Court
27 includes only consensual releases and injunctive provisions, which are indisputably appropriate under
28 Ninth Circuit law. See id. The proposed confirmation schedule for the Plan was sent out to all parties

1 on full notice, no party (including the UST) objected, and the Court approved the objection deadline
2 (and other timing) for the Plan confirmation pursuant to the Amended Disclosure Statement Order.
3 Therefore, all parties in interest had a full and fair opportunity to object to the Plan.

4 **III. CONCLUSION**

5 **WHEREFORE**, Debtor respectfully requests that the Court enter an order (i) overruling the
6 Objection in all respects, (ii) confirming the Plan, and (iii) granting such other and further relief as it
7 deems to be just and proper.

8 Dated this 8th day of January 2013.

9 **FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP**

10 By /s/ Brett Axelrod

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